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Abstract  
This article looks to tie together the polar opposite of hybrid warfare and 
nuclear deterrence. The reason for this is that hybrid warfare and its 
effects on nuclear deterrence  need to be explored as there appears to be 
substantial increases in hybrid warfare’s usage. This article found that 
hybrid warfare has an erosion like effect on nuclear deterrence because 
it increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. This may 
be due to both the fact that hybrid warfare can ignore conventional 
redlines, but also because the cyber aspect of hybrid warfare has 
unintended psychological effects on how deterrence functions. how does 
this relate to nuclear war?  In short, cyber warfare attacks key concepts 
which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including the concepts 
of stability, clarity, and rationality. Therefore, hybrid warfare increases 
the chance of nuclear use. 
Introduction 
The world was forever changed when the Trinity Nuclear test occurred. 
With this initial test, the ultimate destruction of humanity was usurped 
from the realm of gods into human hands. This advent changed the way 
society looked at war, but despite this potential for destruction, or 
perhaps for this very reason, these weapons are some of the best 
peacekeeping tool humanity has ever attained. The sheer, and assured, 
level of ruin they could unleash gives nuclear states a defensive 
advantage and make offensive moves next to impossible. In light of this, 
a defensive focused world gives stability to the international order. As 
Robert Jervis put it, “when the defense is dominant, wars are likely to 
become stalemates and can be won only at enormous cost…raising the 
costs of conquest to unacceptable levels” (Jervis, 1978, 190). When 
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viewed this way, nuclear deterrence has been a key factor in ensuring the 
continuation of peace between major powers.  
Naturally the success of deterrence strategies is difficult to measure as 
only their failures are blatantly obvious, but nuclear deterrence seems to 
have been effective as there has been no offensive nuclear use since 
World War 2. However, the world is not stagnant, and the security 
situation is constantly evolving. Even weapons of mass destruction 
cannot change this. While not completely new, contemporary uses of 
hybrid warfare are causing detrimental erosion on nuclear deterrence. 
For this article, the term hybrid warfare will entail a multitude of 
different short-of-war methods of propaganda, espionage, agitation, 
cyber-attacks, and the eventual use of nationalist identities and 
unmarked soldiers to cause disorder and enact favorable change within 
a state (Lanoska, 2016, 179). These “short of war” methods can function 
separately or in tandem to induce change to the status-quo. Not only does 
hybrid warfare erode nuclear deterrence because much of it undercuts 
the uncrossable redlines1 set by nuclear deterrence, and thus allowing 
hybrid war to become a useable option of conflict which could incite 
unforeseen conflict, but also because aspects of hybrid warfare attack 
key concepts which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including 
the concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. All three are required 
for nuclear deterrence to function in manner that successfully deters 
aggression while simultaneously also ensuring that actual nuclear use is 
as low as possible. They ensure that while states rely on these weapons, 
their use would irreparably change the global stage, and thus should only 
be used as an absolute last resort2. Therefore, this article will argue that 
 
1 Definition of redline in the Cambridge Dictionary is “a limit beyond which 
someone's behaviour is no longer acceptable” (Retrieved from 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/red-line). When a redline is 
crossed, a state would theoretically react in an aggressive manner to match the actions 
taken which crossed their redline.  
2 The use of nuclear weapons against Japan in World War 2 would seem to fly against 
this statement as they are examples of warfighting using nuclear weapons. For the 
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by both eroding the boundaries of deterrence as well as the guiding 
principles that hold conflict in check, hybrid warfare erodes nuclear 
deterrence by increasing the odds that nuclear weapons will eventually 
be used.  
This paper is organized into the following sections:  First, an exploration 
of the ties that bind what appear to be the polar opposites of the 
escalation ladder: hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. Following this, 
the article will delve into the psychological side of the equation and then 
look at how aspects of hybrid warfare erode the previously mentioned 
concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. This second part of the 
argument will primarily explore the perceived threat from general hybrid 
warfare and the specific aspect cyber warfare. Both have intangible 
psychological effects that are detrimental to the viability nuclear 
deterrence. Finally, this article will demonstrate that hybrid warfare 
increases the likelihood of nuclear use by simply being a useable form 
of aggression. This will be achieved by demonstrating a scenario where 
hybrid warfare could escalate to actual war, thus creating a fertile ground 
for nuclear weapons use.  
Definitions and Theory 
Before proceeding with this article, key definitions need to be explained 
and theory explored, specifically the aspects that tie the two key ideas 
together. It is important to note that, as a strategy, hybrid warfare can be 
used by both state and non-state actors alike. The definition used earlier 
does not limit the use of hybrid warfare to any single type of actor. 
Because the discussion here also revolves around nuclear weapons, this 
article has a state-based focus. Specifically, there is a focus on Russia 
and the NATO alliance/United States. However, despite the state based 
 
purposes of this paper they are not being considered because they are outliers in this 
discussion as they effectively pre-date or even began, the nuclear age. Once humanity 
saw what nuclear weapons could do, it can be argued that is when deterrence became 
a concept. 
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approached taken here, one cannot forget about non-state actors. 
Effective attribution, or the lack thereof, is a key aspect of hybrid warfare 
(only in cyber, and only within a specific context).  I can have attribution 
quickly, enough to know who is involved, but not enough to direct the 
counter cyber strike back at. It will often be the case that one cannot 
easily determine if a hybrid attack was the work of a non-state actors, a 
state, or some blurred combination of the two. As it will be seen, even if 
one can determine some degree of attribution, it is often not enough to 
warrant a similar type of response.  Therefore, while it is often states that 
will be discussed here, remembering that non-state actors are almost 
always involved is crucial to exploring hybrid warfare.     
Continuing, when looking at both nuclear deterrence and hybrid warfare, 
one can see that each rest on the metaphorical ladder of escalation, but 
they occur at different ends. Nuclear warfare has the unlimited potential 
for destruction, while hybrid warfare often lacks any open aggression. It 
relies on covert and subversive means to gain an advantage. While the 
two kinds of warfare are usually considered in separate academic realms, 
hybrid warfare should be closely studied by anyone who explores 
nuclear strategy and theory because, unlike real ladders, the ladder of 
escalation is not a linear structure where each action has a predictable 
step up or down. Therefore, it is completely possible that hybrid actions 
could adversely affect nuclear deterrence. The outcome of this 
combination would be unpredictable at best, and at worst is would be 
unseen until it was too late to prevent. Before exploring these ideas, an 
understanding of both terms must first be had.  
First, while an incredibly varied strategy, basic nuclear deterrence can 
be summed up by looking to the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD). This is the cold, yet effective, logic that nuclear states can never 
afford to go to war with one another because the retaliation would be too 
costly. The concept of a “MAD world of deterrable states [posits that] 
states… are sensitive to costs, clearly perceive other states' interests and 
intentions, and value conquests less than others value their independence 
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[and thus] is profoundly peaceful” (Van Evera, 2013, 242). While 
‘profoundly peaceful’ may be a far-off goal for the contemporary world, 
the fact remains that, despite the ability to engage in wars on an 
apocalyptic scale, conflict in this way between major powers has yet to 
occur, and this is arguably due in part to MAD. A key concept here is 
that the destruction nuclear weapons could create is undeniable. Even 
the use of a small number of these weapons could devastate states, and 
this leaves little room from interpretation. No state can ignore this fact. 
Therefore, states act defensively rather than offensively as “the state that 
fears attack does not pre-empt-since that would be a wasteful [and 
dangerous] use of its military resources-but rather prepares to receive an 
attack. Doing so does not decrease the security of others, and several 
states can do it simultaneously; the situation will therefore be stable”  
(Jervis, 1978, 190). When the cost of an attack is too great, a degree of 
stability can exist because every action taken by another state can be 
assumed, at least to greater degree, to not be aggressive. Thus, nuclear 
weapons become the ultimate defensive tool. 
However, perhaps the most important idea to grasp is the almost certain 
eventuality that mistakes will be made, and surprises will occur. 
Furthermore, despite large cuts in nuclear weapon inventories since 
1991, the current number of nuclear weapons is approximately 15,000  
(Arms Control Association, 2018), and when the inevitable mistake is 
made, the entire world would be threatened (Kubrick, 1964).  Even a 
“nuclear war between new nuclear states, say India and Pakistan, using 
much less than 1% of the current global arsenal, could produce so much 
smoke that… it could produce global environmental change 
unprecedented in recorded human history” (Robock, 2010, 419). 
Therefore, defendable nuclear deterrence must be much more than 
simply preventing war. It must ensure the lowest possible chance of 
nuclear use at all times.  This is what hybrid warfare erodes. Not only 
does it allow for aggressive actions to be undertaken, but it also furthers 
accelerates crisis-instability. This concept focuses on the fact that despite 
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any apparent advantages one has made in defense, or in the use of ‘safe’ 
offensive measures, there has in fact been an increase in the likelihood 
of miscalculation and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). 
The ability to defend or the lack of instability, is what hybrid warfare 
erodes.    
 For this article, the term hybrid warfare entails any combination 
of the different short-of-war methods of propaganda, espionage, 
agitation, cyber-attacks, and the possible use of nationalist identities and 
unmarked soldiers to cause disorder and enact favorable change within 
a state (Lanoska, 2016, 179). While nuclear deterrence revolves around 
the concept of certainty, hybrid warfare could be described as the 
antithesis to this certainty.  By its very nature, hybrid warfare is designed 
to be confusing and difficult to pin down. This is both its greatest 
strength and its greatest danger. Rather than being a new form of conflict, 
hybrid warfare is a strategy that the belligerent uses to advance its 
political goals using subversive force instead of blunt conventional 
aggression (Lanoska, 2016, 176). War has always involved far more than 
the use of kinetic force ( Stephen, 2014, 361). Millenia ago, the ancient 
philosopher Sun Tzu wrote on the mental aspects of warfighting and 
claimed: 
For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme 
of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. (Sun 
Tzu, 1963, 77) 
In the modern world, much of what is call hybrid warfare revolves 
around new technology such as cyber warfare and usage of these 
technologies has increased in recent years (Wirtz, 2017, 110). These 
strategies interact with nuclear deterrence by acting as a foil to it. 
Deterrence is a conservative strategy; it seeks to preserve the status quo 
and waits on its adversaries before acting (Slantchev, 2005, 5). Hybrid 
warfare is used by actors who recognize the effective inability to alter 
the status quo through strength of arms. Rather, they conduct short-of-
war strategies to go under, and skirt, the redlines presented by 
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deterrence-based powers. The Russian General Valery Gerasimov, a key 
Russian thinker on hybrid warfare, put forth that the “differences 
between peacetime and wartime will disappear — war is never declared, 
and military actions carried out by uniformed personnel and undercover 
activities will simultaneously support each other” (Holger. M. & 
Vladimir. S, 2018, 319). It is in this idea of constant conflict, or 
permanent undeclared war, one can see the true danger hybrid warfare 
poses to traditional nuclear deterrence. 
As stated in previous sections, deterrence relies on its certainty. This is 
the certainty that an aggressive action could be met with a response so 
great it would negate any gain. However, hybrid warfare counters this 
strategy as it skirts the line of what warrants a response under traditional 
nuclear deterrence. This can be seen in the Russia action in Crimea. 
Former SACEUR General Philip M. Breedlove described the Russia 
hybrid warfare campaign in Crimea as “the most amazing information 
warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information 
warfare” (Vandiver, n.d.). Hybrid warfare often can slip under deterrence 
measures as it lacks openly aggressive actions, and often tries to confer 
an air of legitimacy to its actions. While what happened in Ukraine was 
an attempt to overthrow the local government, much of it was done 
through non-aggressive means, such as propaganda, or in a manner that 
conferred significant deniability to Russia.  
This strategy manages to bypass much of deterrence by effectively going 
under it, thus the certainly that nuclear deterrence can seriously prevent 
aggression is thrown into question. This is not to say that nuclear 
deterrence is not preventing more overt forms of combat, but the 
certainty of deterrence to avert any and all forms of aggression is in 
question. This crack in certainty in turn creates more fear that aggressive 
actions will be taken. In Crimea, Putin gambled that the West’s desire to 
avoid nuclear confrontation would allow him to conduct his operations 
there (Wimmer, 2018). This, combined with the fact that much of what 
occurred there was done using hybrid warfare, paralyzed the West’s 
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ability to deter and react. To this point, both the “EU and NATO have 
attributed Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine to a lack of a forceful 
response from the West to earlier aggression. Russia learned from its 
incursion into Georgia in 2008 that it could use military force against 
non-NATO members in the near abroad without a military response from 
the West” (Hillison, 2017, 342-343). The lack of a response from NATO 
in Crimea fueled the fear of further Russian aggression. It also 
highlighted the reality that because hybrid warfare allows for potential 
unchecked aggression where it didn’t previously exist, states must plan 
for this type of incursion. Furthermore, this perception of threat has 
almost the same effect on states as real threats, especially when it comes 
to nuclear strategy. Betts noted that states could “stumble into [war] out 
of misperception, miscalculation and fear of losing if they fail to strike 
first” (Betts , 2015, para. 14). In a crisis scenario involving nuclear 
weapons, stability is paramount, but a fearful state beset by hybrid 
warfare is unlikely to be stable. The fear of actual aggression can lead to 
an increased number of mistakes as a state could believe it will be 
attacked even if this is not true. Hybrid warfare opens the possibility of 
concrete aggression between superpowers and their allies in way that did 
not previously exist in the modern world due to nuclear deterrence.  It is 
not simply that it allows states to act aggressively, but rather it creates 
crisis instability and increases the chances of nuclear use. The idea that 
hybrid warfare, through the ideas of misperception, could lead to 
conflict, and then nuclear use is further explored by looking at cyber 
warfare and how it erodes nuclear deterrence. 
Cyber Warfare 
This idea of misperception and confusion creating crisis instability is 
continued when looking at the cyber warfare aspect of hybrid warfare. 
Earlier in the article it is claimed that hybrid warfare erodes nuclear 
deterrence; this idea not only revolved around the diminishing 
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence to prevent combat, but also the fact 
that hybrid warfare attacks the key aspects of deterrence that allow it to 
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be a useable strategy. At its core, nuclear deterrence revolves around 
threatening nuclear genocide if attacked. Furthermore, the destructive 
level of this threat is so high that it even threatens our existence as a 
species. To defend such a strategy requires assurance that these weapons 
would likely never be used. Therefore, in the theory of MAD, actors are 
assumed to be rational thinkers would can correctly navigate any crisis 
involving nuclear weapons. While potentially not enough of an 
assurance to defend nuclear deterrence, a stable environment such as one 
where there is time to make decisions/assess the attacks intent/determine 
your own response, which facilitates good decision making is a necessity 
for nuclear deterrence. To help facilitate good decision making, nuclear 
weapons are integrated into systems for command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) (Cimbala, 2017, 489). These systems work to 
provide states with the most accurate information, to ensure that each 
decision is not made under a complete fog-of-war. Furthermore, to avoid 
miscalculation and preventable war, states should have the “best possible 
information about the status of their own nuclear and cyber forces and 
command systems, about the forces and C4ISR of possible attackers, and 
about the probable intentions and risk-acceptance of possible opponents” 
(Cimbala, 2017, 489). What all this effectively means is that navigating 
nuclear deterrence requires reliable information, rationality, and clear 
thinking (Cimbala, 2017, 489). It is these factors that hybrid warfare 
erodes, with cyber warfare its primary tool of doing so.  
While similar in a sense, cyber warfare and its close cousin information 
warfare are in truth very different from each other. The key difference is 
that unlike information warfare where effects are often less directed, 
cyber operations can be used in manner similar to kinetic warfare. Cyber 
war is a means for reducing the “opponent’s” real combat effectiveness; 
this distorts information and fragments their command and control 
system(Timothy. T, 2014, 103). For the clear majority of world history, 
defense has always held the advantage (Jervis, 1978, 213). Familiarity 
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with terrain combined with the strength of defensive technology has 
made securing victory when attacking difficult to achieve. However, 
“cyberspace as a warfighting domain strongly favors the attacker… 
[and] this stands in sharp contrast to our historical understanding of 
warfare, in which the defender has traditionally enjoyed a home-field 
advantage” (Pyung-Kyun, 2015, 387). A cyber-attack allows one to stay 
in the relative safety of home while causing systemic damage without 
warning to adversaries. The forms that cyber warfare can take are 
incredibly varied. They could occur as the crippling of financial markets  
(Pyung-Kyun, 2015, 388), or even the disruption of nuclear command 
and control systems. While not always damaging in the same sense as 
conventional weapons, the threat cyber warfare poses to nuclear 
deterrence cannot be ignored.   
As previously mentioned, nuclear weapons are incorporated in C4ISR 
systems and require reliable intelligence in order to properly deter 
aggression. Poor intelligence allows for possibility of mistakes, 
accidental aggression, or miscalculation of enemy intent. Again, this 
becomes more relevant in a crisis. The crisis scenario is of key 
importance when discussing nuclear weapons as, unless an egregious 
technical mistake was to occur, it is in the moment of crisis that the 
decision to use these weapons would most likely occur. Properly 
managing a crisis involves “both a competitive and cooperative endeavor 
between military adversaries… [and] a crisis is, by definition, a time of 
great tension and uncertainty” (Cimbala, 2017, 490). This uncertainty 
comes  from the ‘fog of war’ that always exists even when intelligence 
is reliable, and the fact that one can never truly know what the adversary 
is planning. The fear of attack, of a first strike, permeates every moment 
during a crisis. Stephen J. Cimbala puts forth that idea that there are four 
critical requirements to successful crisis management: communications 
transparency, accurate perception of an adversary’s behaviors and 
motivations, the existence of safety valves so that each side can leave 
while still saving-face, and the reduction of time pressures on actors  
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(Cimbala, 2017, 492-494). These support the core idea that proper 
nuclear deterrence relies heavily on the psychological concepts of 
stability, clarity, and rationality. The cyber aspect of hybrid warfare 
attacks these ideas through either the disruptions of reliable intelligence 
or through the directly threatening nuclear systems themselves.  
A nuclear crisis between two adversaries is not unlike a tense argument 
where clear communication is key to resolving it peacefully, and cyber 
warfare often distorts this communication. Thus, cyber-attacks on 
C4ISR systems could constitute a serious threat to nuclear deterrence. 
For the Department of Defense, these kinds of attacks would not “be 
mass destruction… but mass and/or precision disruption” (Cimbala, 
2014, 283). This would “disrupt, confuse, demoralize, distract, and 
ultimately diminish the capability of the other side” (Cimbala, 2014, 
283). An assault like this could take the place of a conventional or even 
nuclear strike if it was able to successfully disable the ability to use 
nuclear weapons. However, aside from the conventional-like strike that 
cyber can perform, its ability to disrupt intelligence is equal in the 
erosion of deterrence. This disruption of communication can come about 
in many different forms. An example presented by Cimbala, who has 
studied cyber warfare and nuclear deterrence in depth, illustrates this 
point very clearly. 
Suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the other’s communications 
networks. The virus or worm becomes activated during the crisis and destroys 
or alters information. The missing or altered information may make it more 
difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack. But destroyed or 
altered information may mislead either side into thinking that its signal has 
been correctly interpreted when it has not. Thus, side A may intend to signal 
‘resolve’ instead of ‘yield’ to its opponent on a particular issue. Side B, 
misperceiving a ‘yield’ message, may decide to continue its aggression, 
meeting unexpected resistance and causing a much more dangerous situation 
to develop. (Cimbala, 2017, 495) 
 
In essence, when information becomes confusing with the intent of 
misleading one’s adversary, the end result may not always be what was 
planned. The result of intelligence disruption is far from certain and 
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could lead to aggressive responses rather than defensive submission. 
Altering information through the use of cyber warfare to cripple your 
adversary’s ability to utilize their nuclear weapons, in defense or 
otherwise, will only increase the instability already existent within a 
crisis. As it was stated before, misinformation is the at the heart of crisis 
instability. However, it could be possible that rather than targeting a 
state’s intelligence, the true target of a cyber-attack could the nuclear 
weapon logic controllers themselves. This could be done by severing of 
communication between leaders and the troops involved in launching 
nuclear weapons. While negating the ability for commanders to properly 
command their troops is a powerful strategy, there are again unintended 
psychological effects that create further instability and thus are 
ultimately self-destructive. This takes two different but similar forms.  
If communications were severed between command and their troops on 
the ground, these assets might as well be considered destroyed to a 
certain degree. For if one cannot give the order to launch their weapons, 
then their effective warhead count has gone down and their ability to 
deter has arguably lessened. If one was unable to effectively protect their 
warheads, they could adopt a ‘use them or lose them’ policy in which 
they would have to posture aggressively as they couldn’t reliably deter 
with the threat of a survivable second strike. All of this works to back 
states into a metaphorical corner because “once either side sees parts of 
its command, control, and communications system being subverted by 
phony information or extraneous cyber noise, its sense of panic at the 
possible loss of military options will be enormous” (Cimbala, 2017, 
495). This panic and perceived urgency then also limits the options 
available to actors as they believe they could be facing an imminent 
nuclear strike. In order to navigate the way through a crisis scenario, both 
and time and space are required. Imagine a scenario where President 
Kennedy had lacked the required time need to push the discussion in the 
Cuban missile crisis away from air strikes and invasion. The crisis could 
have very well ended in tragedy (Cimbala, 2017, 497). Therefore, the 
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disruption of communication through hybrid warfare has the added 
effect of increasing crisis instability through the creation of confusion. 
However, the confusion from disruption not only affects leaders, but the 
commanders on the ground as well. Often there is a certain degree of 
autonomy given to commanders when it comes to using nuclear 
weapons. This is done to create some redundancy and resilience in the 
state’s nuclear deterrent option.  This idea has been seen, albeit 
somewhat differently, during the Cold War in mainland Europe. At the 
time, the U.S. was faced with the conventionally armed superior USSR 
who could have pushed through NATO forces. To stop that from 
happening, theorists such as Robert Jervis put forth the idea of ‘The 
Threat That Leaves Something To Chance’ (Christensen, 2012, 450). 
The core concept here was that if the U.S. were to deploy nuclear 
weapons to the frontlines there was the chance that, in the event of a 
Soviet invasion, they would be fired, and this meant that the USSR could 
never be completely sure that a conventional attack wouldn’t escalate to 
all out nuclear war (Christensen, 2012, 466). This was again due to the 
fact that commanders on the ground, in charge of nuclear weapons, often 
had orders to use them if under attack. With this in mind, the USSR 
couldn’t attack mainland Europe and thus the Cold War continued its 
trend of no open warfare directly between the two powers.  
While this strategy is primarily about deterring a superior conventional 
force, the key idea is that, under certain circumstances of attack, 
commanders on the ground could launch their nuclear weapons without 
new orders from on high. While these exact conditions are highly 
classified, it is reasonable to assume that cyber disruption could trigger 
this kind of a launch. As cyber-attacks on nuclear weapons can have a 
similar effect to a kinetic strike on them, and could appear, at least as far 
as the command knows, to be the first sign on an all-out attack, nuclear 
weapons could theoretically be launched. NATO also “[recognized] 
cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself 
as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea” (NATO, Last 
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Updated–2017, Section 70). This falls back onto the ‘use them or loss 
them’ idea presented earlier. Furthermore, if the communication 
between leaders and those on the ground who launch these weapons is 
disrupted then no command could stop the launch3. The old adage of 
cutting the head off the snake then becomes uniquely dangerous in a 
nuclear crisis. Therefore, through cyber warfare, hybrid warfare again 
erodes deterrence by impacting the psychology of those use nuclear 
weapons to deter aggression ultimately adding to crisis instability and 
increasing the chance of nuclear use.  
The Dangers that come from Hybrid Warfare’s Usability 
Cyber warfare is not the only aspect of hybrid warfare that erodes nuclear 
deterrence. As it was previously stated, a key part of deterrence is that 
the very weapons used to deter aggression should never be fired until it 
is the last resort. Furthermore, it was posited that one of hybrid warfare’s 
greatest strengths is that it undercuts the usual redlines set by nuclear 
deterrence. This is again because hybrid warfare lacks the traditional 
markers of conventional attacks; death and destruction. However, while 
this is true, this isn’t to say that hybrid threats shouldn’t be taken as 
seriously as conventional ones. This is due to the ladder of escalation. 
Any form of conflict can escalate into something more then was initially 
planned. Therefore, any weapon that it thought to be free of 
consequence, and therefore easily used, is truly a great threat. For each 
time of conflict, the metaphorical dice is cast, and the potential of 
escalation there.  
Hybrid warfare is the prime example of such a weapon where one can 
attack with a perceived lack of consequences. This was the case in 
 
3 It should be mentioned that there have been many cases where individuals could 
have launched nuclear weapons. (Aksenov, 2013) These often occurred due to 
technical issues or communications failure. The bravery and level headedness of these 
individuals prevailed, and no weapons were fired. However, this does illustrate the 
point that errors can occur, and it was only with great luck that those individuals were 
present at the time.    
Peter Rautenbach 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 
Volume 2, Issue 2 
 
 
Page 15 
Crimea where Russia was met with very little true resistance from the 
international communityThe real question is, fueled by their success in 
Crimea, if Russia were to attempt the same sort of operations in a NATO 
member state, what would the result be? The following scenario explores 
how Russian hybrid warfare against NATO could realistically unfold 
and puts forth that hybrid warfare could escalate to a nuclear exchange4. 
The Use of Hybrid Warfare and the Misperception of Easy Victory 
As an alliance, the cornerstone of NATO’s responsibility is the collective 
defense of its allies (NATO, Last Updated-2018). In the conventional 
context, NATO has no match. Alone, the military spending in the U.S is 
at $598 billion while Russia rests at $66 billion ( Karklis and Taylor, 
2016). While spending levels aren’t the sole determining factor in a 
conflict, they do indicate a greater ability to provide better technologies 
or more well-trained soldiers. Furthermore, in the nuclear arena, despite 
having approximately 7000 nuclear warheads ( Kristensen and Norris, 
2018, 185), Russia cannot gain an easy advantage due to the assured 
level of destruction one would expect/predict as explained by MAD. In 
this light, NATO’s ability to deter Russia from ever openly attacking 
them is relatively secure, however, “the boundaries between… regular 
and irregular warfare are blurring… and states will increasingly turn to 
unconventional strategies to blunt the impact of American power” (Boot, 
2006, 200). While the situation in Ukraine will not be exactly replicated 
in NATO, the threat of hybrid warfare is very real for the Baltic states. 
These states demonstrate a few key requirements for being prime targets 
of hybrid warfare. To begin with, they are home to fractured ethnic and 
linguistic groups which are primarily Russian in nature. These ties confer 
an informational advantage to Russia, as it gains a better understanding 
 
4 This scenario comes from previous paper written from this author (Peter 
Rautenbach) that explored how the usability of hybrid warfare, and the assumption of 
being able to use it without a punishing response could trip states into war, and even 
nuclear conflict. It is being discussed here as it is a prime example of how hybrid 
warfare increases the chances of nuclear war.  
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of local rivalries and grievances (Lanoska, 2016, 189). Furthermore, 
because the Baltic states are not particularly strong states, they are unable 
to mend these grievances and this allows them to be manipulated by 
belligerents such as Russia (Lanoska, 2016, 189).  Therefore, they are 
vulnerable to the use of subversive hybrid warfare by Russia, and despite 
their protection under Article 5, it is unclear what NATO could do to 
deter and defend against this form of aggression (Lanoska, 2016, 175).  
This situation seems to indicate that, not only could Russia potentially 
see success in their effort to conduct hybrid warfare in the region, but 
that they might be able to do so without serious repercussions. However, 
while it is true that there is difficulty in responding to hybrid warfare, 
any hope that NATO would fail to respond is misplaced. Van Evera 
placed false hope at the center for his theories on the causes of war, and 
hybrid war is a prime example of this concept. For him, “war is more 
likely when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome” (Van 
Evera, 2013, 14). This is all a matter of perception, and if states believe 
that they can achieve victory, then they will attempt to gain it. Of course, 
most of the worst wars in human history have started as a result of 
misperception.  In World War One (WWI), there was the misperception 
that offensive action would lead to easily achieved victory, but it was 
defensive technology that was superior, and this mistake directly led to 
the prolonged nature of World War One (WWI)I and thus caused it to be 
one of the bloodiest wars in history (Jervis, 1978, 191). The opposite is 
true for World War Two (WWII). Due to the defensive nature of the 
WWI, it was believed that after WWI there was once again a defensive 
advantage. This was again a case of misperception that led to conflict. 
New technology improvements in tank and airplane technology 
combined with tactical innovations such as the Blitzkrieg had in fact 
created an offensive advantage (Jervis, 1978, 191). If states had correctly 
perceived this advantage perhaps the outbreak of  WWII could have been 
prevented. The danger of hybrid warfare is that is appears to circumvent 
traditional aggression and therefore it could add a false air of confidence 
Peter Rautenbach 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 
Volume 2, Issue 2 
 
 
Page 17 
to states. When considering the ladder of escalation, any strategy that 
makes war easier and more likely is dangerous.  
NATO, Article 5, and Responding to Hybrid Warfare 
To maintain the security of member nations, there are two scenarios 
where NATO would respond to hybrid warfare. The first of these focuses 
on the possibility of Russian forces being deployed as unmarked militia 
within NATO states. The first steps of hybrid warfare have been 
described as covert in the sense that they focus on the use of short-of-
war strategies which aim to destabilize a country. These can take many 
forms and such tactics could include information warfare, cyber warfare, 
and the use of criminal activities. These are designed to add an element 
of chaos to a state and weaken its ability to respond to the next stage 
which could involve nationalist uprisings. If the state of affairs within a 
NATO ally followed this destabilizing trend, and even involved a civil 
war and armed conflict, it is plausible to assume NATO could get 
involved in some capacity and Article 55 could be invoked. This idea 
was codified in the latest NATO summit in Warsaw, as NATO declared 
that it was “prepared to assist an ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign, 
[that] the Alliance and Allies will be prepared to counter hybrid warfare 
as part of collective defense, [and that] the Council could decide to 
invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” (NATO, Last Updated-2017, 
Section 72). Aside from the danger that any conflict brings, the later 
stages of hybrid warfare in Ukraine involved the use of unmarked 
Russian troops as militia. If this pattern were repeated in a Baltic conflict, 
then a NATO intervention would mean a direct confrontation with 
Russian troops. While it is difficult to say where the situation would 
exactly go at this point, nonetheless NATO and Russian troops could be 
 
5 Article 5 is a provision within the NATO treaty that stipulates that an attack on one 
member nation is an attack on all. If used, all other members will join their ally in the 
conflict. 
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engaged in conflict, and this could lead to escalation out of simple hybrid 
warfare and into the conventional realm.  
There is also the fact that NATO could respond to any cyber operation 
conducted against the alliance. While the unintentional psychological 
effects of cyber warfare and how it erodes nuclear deterrence has already 
been discussed earlier in this article, cyber warfare also has a part to play 
in this scenario. In that section, it was put forth that cyberattacks on a 
state’s nuclear deterrence apparatus could trigger a retaliatory strike. 
This certainly points to the danger of cyberattacks, and how even 
something simply meant to confuse or destabilize could trigger nuclear 
use. However, directly targeting nuclear weapons and their command 
structure isn’t the only way cyber warfare could lead to actual conflict. 
If a NATO member state were struck by a cyber-attack that mirrored a 
conventional strike, it is plausible that this could trigger Article 5 and to 
an extension, a military response.   
While NATO does recognize cyberspace as a domain of operations, 
similar to air, land, and sea” (NATO, Last Updated-2017, Section 70), 
the exact time a cyberattack merits a hard power response is not easy to 
determine. Like the clear majority of hybrid warfare, the ambiguity of 
cyber-attacks makes responding difficult and often disproportionate. 
During a NATO military exercise in 2010 in which a sophisticated 
cyber-attack was simulated, it “became apparent that no one ‘could 
pinpoint the country from which the attack came” (Markoff et al, 2010). 
On the other hand, “the US could quickly attribute the 2014 Sony attack 
to the North Korean State, and the recent hacking of the Democratic 
National Committee has been attributed to the Russian State” 
(Stockburger, 2016, 578). Attribution is a possibility. The question that 
remain is that if an attack could be attributed, when would it merit an 
Article 5 level response? A test development by Professor Michael 
Schmitt was designed to determine when a cyber-attack amounted to a 
use of force. The conditions it set are: “(1) severity; (2) immediacy; (3) 
directness; (4) invasiveness; (5) measurability of effects; (6) military 
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character; (7) State involvement; and (8) presumptive legality” (Schmitt, 
1999, 903). While all of these are important in determining when to 
respond, the first factor - the severity of an attack, is perhaps the most 
important. While the 2007 attack on the Estonian financial institution 
was undoubtedly both a use of force and a breach of sovereignty, it 
would be difficult to defend the use of NATO military force in response. 
On the other hand, if this attack had instead targeted a power grid, 
knocking out power for hospitals and resulting in the deaths of patients, 
a NATO response would have been far more likely. However, even in 
this scenario, there is serious doubt as to how NATO would respond. It 
was recently revealed “that hundreds of deaths a year could be caused 
by computer problems” (Pickover, 2018) in the National Health Service. 
Furthermore, they put forth that “WannaCry ransomware attack - which 
crippled parts of the NHS last year – ‘could have killed a lot of people’” 
(Pickover, 2018). The WannaCry ransomware attack has been blamed 
on North Korea by many states including the US and the UK (BBC, 
2017). Despite this apparent attribution to a state, there has not been 
much of a response by NATO. This could be due to the issue with the 
measurability of deaths caused by the WannaCry attack and the fact that 
while faulty computers appear to have caused these deaths, the specific 
number of those directly linked to North Korea is unknown. 
Furthermore, the attack on the hospital appears to have not be targeted 
but an unintended casualty once the attack was released on the globe. 
The circumstantial and vague nature of the attribution and scattered 
nature of the targeting undercut the ability to respond to the WannaCry 
attack. Nonetheless, the difficulty that comes with properly responding 
to a cyber-attack should not distract from properly exploring the possibly 
of a respond.  There are real scenarios where a response does appear 
possible, especially if the attacked states called for NATO support. 
Naturally, all of this is hypothetical, but as boundaries are pushed and 
probed, eventually something will push back.  
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Russian Reaction to a NATO Response 
In all, it appears very clear that there are many cases of hybrid warfare 
to which NATO would ultimately respond with military force. How this 
would exactly unfold is hard to predict, but the alliance’s resolve can’t 
be ignored. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that hybrid operations 
against NATO could in fact escalate to conventional conflict. The final 
question is how would Russia react if NATO forces encountered Russian 
militia or military personal during hybrid operations. This is where 
nuclear weapons enter the equation. As previously mentioned, these 
types of operations are undertaken by those who want to change the 
status-quo but cannot due so openly. NATO’s vast military might, 
combined with nuclear deterrence is primarily why Russia has increased 
its usage of hybrid warfare. Russia has also adopted lower thresholds for 
the use of nuclear weapons. Russia lacks both the ability to enact 
favorable change against the status-quo, or as well as combat threats 
from NATO, and therefore they needed to adapt. Within Russia, 
“military leaders have openly stated that Russia has deliberately lowered 
the nuclear use threshold and talk about the use of nuclear weapons in 
regional and local wars” (Schneider, 2008, 397). A regional or local war 
could easily mean a conflict in the Baltics. This indicates an increased 
reliance on nuclear weapons for Russia as they are being assigned to 
situations where conventional weapons were once the answer. The 
weapons that would be used in the face of American conventional power 
would be the smaller tactical nuclear weapons which are intended for 
battlefield use and have at most 100 tons of TNT in explosive power  
(Schneider, 2008, 397). While this doesn’t come close to rivaling the 
explosive power used in Hiroshima, a single one of these weapons would 
drastically alter any battlefield. This is known as the Russian policy to 
‘escalate to de-escalate’. This policy is comparable to MAD except that 
where MAD threatens unacceptable damage, de-escalation through 
limited nuclear strikes “provides instead for infliction of ‘tailored 
damage’ [which is] defined as damage [that is] subjectively unacceptable 
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to the opponent [and] exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to gain 
as a result of the use of military force” (Sokov, 2014 ). While the 
immediate explosion would be devastating, the real risk is that of further 
escalation. The first use of nuclear weapons is a potential existential 
threat as most states have doctrines that demand that they then respond 
in kind to prevent further use by adversaries. These doctrines were 
designed to only threaten nuclear use so that these weapons would never 
be truly used, but as in this example, they might be forced to demonstrate 
their resolve and prove their deterrent is credible. For if one doesn’t 
respond when their deterrent demands, then how credible is their 
deterrent? It is technically possible that each side would exchange 
nuclear warheads in a limited manner, leading to a great risk of further 
nuclear escalation. 
With this scenario in mind, one can see how the usability of hybrid 
warfare, and the misperception of a lack of response, could ‘trip’ states 
into conflict. This demonstrates another way in which hybrid warfare 
can unintentionally contribute to crisis instability. By its very nature 
hybrid warfare creates instability, and because of the possibly 
misperceived inability of NATO to respond, it is a real danger to nuclear 
deterrence. This misperceived inability to respond to hybrid warfare is 
what erodes the ability of states to properly use deterrence as a strategy. 
If Russia were to attempt to replicate their success in Ukraine against a 
NATO member states, there is a realistic path of escalation that goes all 
the way to nuclear use. Therefore, because it is perceived to be a useable 
weapon which is free from reproach, hybrid warfare increases the chance 
of nuclear use.     
Conclusion 
This article sought to tie together the two concepts of hybrid warfare and 
nuclear deterrence. In doing so, it put forth that aspects of hybrid 
warfare, more specifically cyber warfare, directly erode the viability of 
nuclear deterrence as a strategy. When states use nuclear weapons to 
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deter aggression, they are effectively threatening genocide. While 
terrible, it could be the situation that this destruction is possibly 
preferable to world devoid of nuclear deterrence. Be careful Regardless, 
putting aside any debate on this cold logic, deterrence must have a limit. 
The entirety of the world should never be threatened for the safety of 
one’s state. This is a cost to high to pay. Hybrid warfare erodes both the 
boundaries of deterrence as well as the guiding principles that hold 
conflict in check, thus corrodes nuclear deterrence by increasing the odds 
that nuclear weapons will eventually be used. Therefore, one can never 
ignore even the seemly short-of-war strategies because they increase 
crisis-instability. In a sense they act as a subtle knife that attacks 
deterrence with a thousand shallow cuts. Sowing misperception and 
confusion in their wake. Shallow or not, anything that erodes deterrence 
must be looked at with the upmost scrutiny. Humanity only has one 
planet, and it is our responsibly to safeguard it from threats such as these.     
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